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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. 78-22(3)(j). On July 17, 2003 the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to
the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues to be determined by the Appellate Court chiefly resolve
around whether a mechanics lien that may have a facial deficiency
prescribed by statute can be declared a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9-1.
Appellant believes that in the process of the case that the court made several
reversible errors, including; declaring a mechanics lien wrongful, Granting
summary judgment without a motion for such being before the court,
Granting summary judgment for $3000 when no evidence was ever
presented to move judgment from the $1000 prescribed by statute to $3000
prescribed under certain conditions, awarding cost and attorney fees related
to pursuing damages under mechanics lien statute when the issues from
mechanics lien statues were dismissed, and changing the amount of a
previous award of attorney fees without any reason or factual basis.
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DETERMINATIVE ISSUES
a. Issue Number One:

First Issue to be determined by the

Court is whether a Mechanics Lien that may be Facially Invalid
by failing to meet one of the steps outlined in Mechanics Lien
statute becomes a Wrongful Lien pursuant to UCA. 38-9-1, and
therefore subject to the summary proceedings provided in Utah
Code Ann. 38-9-7. This Issue calls for statutory interpretation
and thus presents a question of law which should be reviewed
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions.
b. Issue Number Two:

Whether a Mechanics Lien

filed pursuant to UCA 38-1-3, but failed to state the time work
started and stopped per UCA 38-1-7, should be declared void.
This presents a correction of error becaus,; the issue is in
conflict with previous appellate rulings in that "failure to
comply with statutory requirement for notice of mechanic's lien
will be viewed as technical, and will be upheld in absence of
any prejudice, unless failures have compromised a purpose of
the Mechanics Lien statute." Projects Unlimited v. Copper
State Thrift 798 P.2d 738. (Utah 1990)
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c. Issue Number Three:

Whether Trial Court was in error in

awarding attorneys fees under the Wrongful Lien statute for the
entire case, when much of the work done by Appellee(s)
counsel was done to obtain damages through the Mechanics
Lien statute and those charges were dismissed. The standard of
review is actually a rule of law and not a finding of fact. Court
of Appeals will grant deference to the fact finder only when the
findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the Courts decision. Woodward v. Fazio,
823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991).
d. Issue Number Four:

Whether Trial Court was in error in

awarding additional fees already ruled excessive from first
award of fees, without any additional finding that Plaintiff was
somehow now done work to deserve the additional fees. The
standard of review is actually a rule of law and not a finding of
fact. Court of Appeals will grant deference to the fact finder
only when the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to
disclose the evidentiary basis for the Courts decision.
e. Issue Number Five:

Whether the trial court was in error in

awarding $3000 dollars in damages pursuant to the Wrongful
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Lien statute through a summary judgment when there was a
material dispute of fact related to Statute that grants court right
to award $3000 damages, as provided in UCA 38-9-4. This
Issue calls for statutory interpretation and thus presents a
question of law which should be reviewed for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
ISSUE NUMBER SIX: Whether court was in error in granting
Summary Judgment on claims for Wrongful Lien when no
motion for summary judgment existed. Rule 56(c) of Rules of
Civil Procedure state "( c ) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and
served in accordance with CJA 4-501." No Motion was
made by Appellee(s) and as such this also becomes a rule of
Law and should be reviewed for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial courts legal conclusions.
ISSUE NUMBER SEVEN:

Whether court was in error

when it denied Appellant the right to amend response to include
a counter claim against Appellee(s). The Motion was filed on
the grounds that new evidence had been found that could not
have been known about at the time of the original filing of the
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response. This is an issue of discretion on the part of the trial
court. Court denied motion for amendment on the grounds that
the Appellee(s) had already submitted a proposed final order
and court had subsequently signed such. If court determines
that Wrongful Lien statute is not appropriate disposition to the
facts of this case, Appellant should have been allowed to file
Counter Claim as it was needed to defend against Damages
being sought under Mechanics Lien statute. "Rule 15(a) of
Utah 'Rules of Civil Procedure permits the amendment of
pleadings by leave of the court, and the rule is to be liberally
construed so as to further the interests of Justice ..." Girard v.
Appleby 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). "When holder of
mechanics lien brings action to enforce lien through
counterclaim and principle claim would defeat lien claim,
successful defense must necessarily be considered for purpose
of awarding attorneys fees under Mechanics Lien statute".
First General Services v. Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App.
1996). This issue is an issue of discretion and as such a
correction of error but because this is a summary judgment all
findings of the court should be review as conclusions of law
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and should be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial courts legal conclusions Bonhan v. Morgan 788 P.2d
497 (Utah 1989).. This issue is brought up only because if
Appellate Court agrees that wrongful lien statute is not
appropriate in this case, Appellant would need counter claim to
continue defense of Mechanics Lien claims on the part of
Appellee(s).
h. ISSUE NUMBER EIGHT:

Whether Appellee(s) should be

further bared from seeking damages under the Mechanics Lien
statute as the Petition to Nullify Lien that was filed by
Appellee(s) on May 2, 2002 was brought under Wrongful Lien
statute. If the Appellate Court decides that Wrongful Lien
statute was not an appropriate disposition to this case then
Appellee(s) should forever be barred from seeking damages
under the Mechanics Lien statute as the appropriate way to have
an invalid Mechanics Lien dismissed is prescribed by UCA 381-28 in which an alternate security is to be provided in an
amount of 150% of the lien amount. No Alternate security was
provided and Subsequent to the ruling of Court on June 17,
2002 Appellant released said lien and can not have it re-instated
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and has lost most of the rights associated with holding a lien.
Because of the time transpired those rights can not be
reinstated.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant filed a Mechanics Lien on a Residence owned by
Appellee(s) Edson and Sharon Packer. The Mechanics lien was for work
and material done and furnished by both Appellant Earl Cline and his
then wife Julie, the daughter of Appellee(s). The work was for a Giant
Mural hand painted in the children's room. The Mural was over 40 feet
long and close to ten feet high. Although much of the work on the mural
was done by Appellants then wife, both sides agreed that Appellant him
self had done "some work" on the painting. Appellant believed that
because of a partnership with wife Julie and because both Appellant and
Julie were told that when they were finished with the painting that they
would be paid for it by Appellee, Mrs. Packer, that he had a right to lien
the home for the unpaid work. A lien was filed in the amount of $70,300.
A Notice was sent from Appellee(s) Counsel Shawn Turner stating
that they believed that the lien was a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9-1,
giving Appellant 20 days to remove the lien. Appellant believed the lien
was valid and failed to remove said lien. A hearing was held in Fourth
11

District court on June 17, 2002. The Judge stated at the very first that
"this is most assuredly not a Wrongful Lien", but preceded with the
hearing. During questing by the Judge, Appellant admitted that the lien
didn't state the date work started and stopped on the project. Appellant
also admitted that there wasn't a notice required if the lien was on a
"Owner Occupied Residence". There is a dispute as to whether the work
done on Appellee(s) home would require the notice. Appellant disputed
the allegation that the lien was not timely. The Court ordered that the lien
was void, but at the time didn't state that the lien was Wrongful. Later
after a disagreement about whether attorney fees could be awarded under
the Mechanics Lien statute the court ordered that the fees be awarded
under the Wrongful Lien statute.
After some discovery Appellee(s) motioned for a summary judgment on
all causes including wrongful lien and damages per the Mechanics Lien
statute, and Punitive Damages. Court rejected the motion for summary
judgment and stated that no punitive damages could be awarded as both
statutes provided a form of punitive damages. Court also stated that
Appellee(s) would have to pursue damages under one section or the other,
but they were prevented from seeking damages under both statutes. Several
months later Appellee(s) filed a Motion for relief from order and it was
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denied, but court issued a memorandum of decision that stated that if
Appellee(s) filed for summary judgment on only the wrongful lien statute,
that court would grant such a motion. The motion was never filed but
Appellee(s) simply submitted a final order and judgment for review. The
failure to file the motion prohibited Appellant from arguing whether the
court should award the $1000 damages or the $3000 which would depend
upon the evidences presented. At about the same time Appellant submitted a
counter claim and Petition to grant permission to file counterclaim.
Permission was not granted because a couple of weeks later Court signed
final order presented by Appellee(s). A motion to amend was filed by
Appellant and that was denied by court. The Appellant has appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues the among other things, Courts decision that
mechanics lien was facially invalid and as such became a wrongful lien is in
error as it conflicts with numerous court of appeals cases as well as state
statutes. Appellant argues that decision to grant summary judgment based
upon Wrongful lien statute was wrong because; 1. Issues should have been
handled under the mechanics lien statute, and 2. Because court granted
summary judgment of $3000 when testimony and argument were not able to
13

establish that Appellant was guilty of any type of fraud or had any
knowledge that the lien was wrongful at the time of filing. Therefore even if
Wrongful lien statute is appropriate to case, judgment should have been only
$1000. Appellant argues that court abused discretion in granting attorneys
fees for the entire case, when Appellant clearly prevailed on Mechanics lien
issues and those fees should have been removed from any award of attorneys
fees. Finally Appellant argues that court abused discretion by allowing
Appellee to skip several steps needed to grant summary judgment, which
prejudiced Appellant in his defense of the case.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
The First issue to be determined is whether a mechanics lien that may
have a deficiency that is required from the mechanics lien statute is a
Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9. Appellee argued originally that Appellant
was not entitled to file a Mechanics Lien. UCA 38-1-3 states the following
are entitled to file a mechanics lien, "Contractors, subcontractors, and all
persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or
equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
14

superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented
materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the lien
is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and
Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property." (emphasis added)
Both parties agreed that Appellant had done "some work". In addition
Appellant testified that he had provided materials to the project. Even if
Appellant wasn't entitled to lien for the work that his then wife had done, he
still had the right to lien for the work that he had done. It is clear that
Appellant was "entitled" to file a mechanics lien as per Statute. The dispute
would then be the value of the work done and if the lien overstated that
value. The dispute of value would clearly be handled within the mechanics
lien section and there would not be any reason to have the mechanics lien
declared a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9.
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The Appellee(s) suggested that the lien overstated the value of the
work. Appellee Edson Packer stated in his affidavit that his daughter and
Appellants then wife Julie painted the painting. Appellant testified through
affidavits that Appellee, Sharon Packer had promised to pay both Julie and
Appellant for the work when it was completed. During one conversation
Julie and Appellee Sharon Packer, agreed that the value of the painting
would have been over $60,000. Appellant testified that not only was he told
that he would be paid for the work when it was done, but that his wife Julie
and himself were involved in a partnership which would give Appellant the
right to file the lien for the work that both he and his then wife had done.
Again not a valid reason to have this lien declared Wrongful under UCA 389.
At the June 17, 2002 hearing, the Court made the statement from the
bench that "well, let me just make this comment. I've has several of these
types of hearings. The definition, the definition of a wrongful lien, you
know is, basically states that a, a wrongful lien is a lien that is not
authorized by law or not signed by the owners of the, of the property.
Clearly a mechanic's lien is authorized by law. It might, you know, and
I understand that you allege that Mr. Cline, that the lien might be
groundless. But it's clearly not a wrongful lien, is k?" At that point the
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court asked Appellant if the lien stated the time work started and stopped,
and he admitted that it didn't. Appellant was then asked if the lien included
the notice as required by statute for a owner occupied residence and he
admitted that it didn't. There was a question as to whether the lien was
timely and Appellant disputed that argument and even stated to court as to a
time frame of when the work stopped. In subsequent argument to the court
Appellant was able to show that the notice required by statute for owner
occupied home only applies in a situation where a contractor is hired by
written contract to build an owner occupied new home.

"PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVIL ACTION.
Notice is hereby provided in accordance with Section 38-11108 of the Utah Code that under Utah law an "owner" may
be protected against liens being maintained against an
"owner-occupied residence" and from other civil action
being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified
services" performed or provided by suppliers and
subcontractors as a part of this contract, if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) the owner entered into a written contract an original
17

contractor, a factory built housing retailer, or a real estate
developer;
(2) the original contractor was properly licensed or exempt
from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act at the time the contract
was executed; and
(3) the owner paid in full the original contractor, factory
built housing retailer, or real estate developer or their
successors or assigns in accordance with the written
contract and any written or oral amendments to the
contract.
Failure to include this language on the Notice of Lien may
result in lien foreclosure being denied. Additionally, every lien
claimant is required to provide to the homeowner instruction
on how to gain protection from the lien under the Act and a
form answer, affidavit, and motion for summary judgment as
part of the lien foreclosure action documents (Utah Code Ann.
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§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a)). Failure to provide the form will result in the
foreclosure action being denied."
Clearly the only issue that may entitle the court to determine that the
lien filed is a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9 is the failure to state the date
work stopped and started.
In researching for this appeal Appellant searched at great length for a
case similar to this. The only case found was a Washington Supreme Court
Case PATRICK v. BONTHIUS 124 P.2d 550, in which the court
determined that direct testimony by contractor as to date on which work was
completed was sufficient to show the time when the last work and materials
were furnished. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled a number of times on
issues regarding the purported facial deficiencies in a Mechanics lien,
although not specifically to the issue of the date and time work started and
stopped.
In PARK CITY MEAT CO. et al. V. COMSTOCK SILVER
MINING CO. et al. 103 p. 254 (Utah Supreme 1909) the Court ruled that
"Where there has been a substantial compliance with the Statute creating a
mechanics lien, and the lien has in fact been established, the lien will not be
defeated by mere technicalities or nice distinctions". In PROJECTS
19

UNLIMITED v, COPPER STATE THRIFT 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990),
The court ruled; "We begin our analysis by recognizing that "the
purpose of mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to
provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added
directly to the value of the property of another by their materials or
labor." Calder Bros Co. v. Anderson, 652 P. 2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On
the other hand, we recognize that liens create "an encumbrance on
property that deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and
impairs his credit." First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen 631 P.2d919, 924
(Utah 1981). A fact the importance of which is magnified by the prerecordation priority accorded a valid mechanic's lien. See Utah Code
Ann. 38-1-5 (1988). State legislatures and courts attempt to balance
these competing interest through their mechanic's lien statutes and
judicial interpretations thereof."
"[2] Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and a lien claimants may
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provision
authorizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Mecham 366P.2d 598, 600
(1961). However, Utah Courts have recognized that substantial
compliance with these provisions is all that is required. Chase v.
Dawson, 215 P.2d 390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660
20

P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we have stated that "[a] lien once
acquired by labor performed on a building with the consent of the
owner should not... be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of
others are infringed, and no express command of the statute is
disregarded". Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin 87P. 713, 716 (Utah 1906);
see also Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989. Courts
from other states also subscribe to this view. See H.A.M.S. Co. v.
Electrical Contractors ofAlaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977);
Horseshoe Estates v. 2MCo., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986)."
"Although courts have differing opinions about how liberally to
construe provisions within their mechanic's lien statutes, "the modern
trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable
value in a particular fact situation Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v.
Jepson Elec. Contracting, Inc. 537P.2d80, 83 (Or. 1975). Utah has
Followed this trend both in the legislature and in the courts..."
"[3] With these general principles in mind, we turn to the particular
arguments in this case. We must determine whether the rigorous
interpretations urged by the Banks are necessary to protect the interests
of the parties in the instant situation. Unless we find that Projects'
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alleged failures have comprised a purpose of the mechanic's lien statute,
those failures will be viewed as technical, and in the absence of any
prejudice, we will uphold the lien."
The issue to be properly determined by the court is whether
Appellants failure to state time worked started and stopped somehow
prejudiced Appellee in their case. If not, then lien should have been upheld
by court. As Previously quoted above Washington Supreme Court ruled that
in a suit to foreclose a mechanics lien, that the time work started and stopped
could properly be introduced verbally in testimony in court. Appellee(s) do
not ever claim to be prejudiced by the claim notice, in fact they preceded
with a suit for damages based upon the mechanics lien statute. In the June
17, 2002 hearing, they were prepared to offer testimony as to when the
worked started and stopped. Although Utah Code does require that the
information be a part of the lien notice for a mechanics lien, the purpose is
provided within UCA 38-1-5 which states that "The liens herein provided
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of commencement
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when
the building, improvement or structure was commenced...". Since
22

there were no other competing lien claims, the only one that could have been
prejudiced was a mortgage company, that may have loaned on the property
since the work began, but there are not claims from any mortgage company,
therefore the lien should have been ruled a valid mechanics lien.
On the outside chance that the court was correct in determining the
lien to not be valid due to it being deficient per statute, there is no provision
within statute to move a mechanics lien that may be invalid to summary
proceedings per UCA 38-9. In fact UCA 38-9-2 (3) states that "this chapter
does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Liens." Appellant
has already established that he was entitled to file a lien under 38-1-3.
Appellee have acknowledge that the lien falls under Title 38, Chapter 1,
Mechanics Liens by attempting to sue for damages under that section. UCA
38-1-28 provides that any owner who disputes the validity or correctness
of a mechanics lien may record a notice of release of lien and
substitution of alternative security. Appellee come to court alleging that
Appellant did not comply with the strictures of the Mechanics Lien statute,
yet they are the ones that failed to comply.
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It is clear that even if the lien filed by appellant is ruled invalid
because of a deficiency, that it should not have been ruled a Wrongful Lien
under UCA 38-9 as this is in conflict with the very provisions of the
Wrongful Lien Section. In addition the Appellate courts have already
decided the issue of what constitutes a Wrongful Lien. In Russell v.
Thomas 999 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 2000), The court concluded that if
Defendants didn't have an interest in the property, that Wrongful Lien
section applied. In This case all parties agreed that Appellant had an interest
in the property, therefore Wrongful Lien section does not apply. Appellant
also found Kurth v. Wiarda 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1999), in which
there was disputes about the validity of a purported mechanics lien, and one
party attempted to invoke Wrongful Lien section. Court dismissed the
contractors suit for mechanics lien issues, but also denied Kirths wrongful
lien claims. It is clear that even if a mechanics lien is somehow declared
invalid, that it does not give the court the right to move that mechanics lien
claim to summary proceedings based upon Wrongful I ien section.
Appellee were awarded $3000 in damages based upon the provisions
of UCA 38-9-5 which state that;
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(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the
real property, knowing or having reason to know that the
document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim
If a person files a wrongful lien and refuses to have it released within
20 days then they are liable for $1000 in damages. Under this damages
section of the wrongful lien chapter, if Appellant filed a wrongful lien he
would only be liable to Appellee for $1000, unless they could establish that
either Appellant knew that the lien was wrongful lien, or the lien was
groundless or it contained a material misstatement or false claim. No
evidence was ever presented that Appellant was responsible for any of those
three issues that would entitle the court to charge him $3000. In Memo in
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Support of Summary Judgment filed by Appellee(s) they used request for
admissions Number 4, and Number 11, and stated that that Appellant had
admitted them. Both of those statement were denied by Appellant and in
fact Appellant filed an affidavit with his response to motion to Summary
Judgment that again denied those assertions. Paragraph 7 of that affidavit
stated that "The lien I filed was before the divorce action was filed, and
was not done to "Punish the Packers for supporting their daughter" as
was alleged."" Paragraphs 1 1 - 1 3 stated that Appellant had personally done
work on the painting and had been told by Mrs. Packer that we would be
paid for the work. Her exact words were "y° u kids could really use the
money and I want to pay you for it."

The final order stated that Appellant knew that the lien was wrongful.
Appellant has argued all through out that proceedings that the lien was not
even subject to Wrongful Lien Chapter. It is difficult to figure out how he
was to have know that the lien was wrongful. In fact if he knew that the lien
was missing the date and time work started prior to filing said lien, why
wouldn't he have corrected it instead of risking going through all this legal
crap. Both sides agreed that the work had been done and that Appellant had
done "some work", therefore it is difficult to establish that the lien was
groundless. There was disputed testimony as to the value of the lien and
26

Appellant testified that Appellee Sharon Packer stated in a conversation with
him that it was worth $60,000 for the painting. The additional amount was
for stenciling around fireplace and other work. Appellee testified through
affidavit that the painting had ''sentimental value as it was painted by his
daughter, but had no significant financial value." Reason and logic
would demonstrate that a giant mural that was over 40 feet long and 10 feet
high has some financial value. In any event the issue of the value of the
painting is a disputed issue and should not subject Appellant to summary
judgment for $3000. Again the Appellant believes that the trial court is in
error in awarding $3000 in damages.

On the issue of award of Attorneys fees, Appellant disagrees with the
several of the trial Courts findings. At June 17, 2002 hearing, Appellee was
awarded attorney fees and Appellant was told that he could file objection to
those fees. Appellee through council filed affidavit of fees requesting $1200
in legal fees. Court granted $750 and ruled that remainder was excessive.
At the end of the case an affidavit of attorneys fees was re-submitted to the
court asking for $3945 in Legal Fees plus filing fees in the amount of $160.
The $3945 included the exact same legal fees that Appellee had tried to bill
at the beginning of the case and court had already ruled to be excessive.
Court granted Attorneys fees in the amount of $3750. One hundred and
27

ninety five dollars of that were already ruled excessive by the court. No
additional evidence was presented to justify the additional award of
attorneys fees. Appellate recognizes that trial court has broad discursion in
awards of attorneys fees, but in this incidence where no additional evidence
was provided to support such an award previously ruled excessive,
Appellant believes trial court is in error.
Appellant also believes Trial Court is in error when it awarded
Appellee(s) an award for attorney fees that included all legal fees from the
entire case. Much of the work done on the case by Appellee(s) council was
for damages related to the mechanics lien and Appellant was the successful
party on any damages related to mechanics lien claims. In Kurth v.
Wirada, previously quoted above court made findings that included
adjusting non-compensable claims intertwined with compensable claims. In
this case, trial court just awarded Appellee(s) all fees expended in the case
and made no adjustment for work that was done in regard to damages related
to mechanics lien. In this Appellant argues that court was in error in the
amount of fees awarded. If Appellants claim that Wrongful Lien is not
appropriate disposition to this case, then no Attorney fees should have been
awarded to Appellee(s).
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Finally Appellant argues that court abused is discretion when it signed
final order without there being any motion for summary judgment with
which the court could grant such motion. On September 20, 2002,
Appellee(s) motioned for summary judgment on all counts. At November
27, 2002 hearing motion for summary judgment was denied by court. At
that point if Appellee disagreed with the decision they could have submitted
an order for courts signature and then moved court for reconsideration of
that order. They could have also filed a new motion for summary judgment
on just the wrongful lien issue. Appellee did neither but waited two months
and then filed a motion for relief from order based upon Rule 4-501. Rule 4501 has been repealed, but may have been in effect at the time of said
motion, but even if it was it says nothing about motions for relief from order,
thus the motion was improper. Court issued a memo stating that there was
not an order from which to seek relief from, but stated that the court would
grant a motion for summary judgment for the minimum damages from the
wrongful lien statute. At that point Appellee should have submitted a
motion for summary judgment, and Appellant should have had a right to
motion for oral arguments on the issue and other rights available to him.
Appellant was denied those rights and Appellate Court can now look at this
issue as an abuse of discretion on part of trial court.
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Appellant also notes that on Feb 28, 2003 that Appellee mailed a copy
of a proposed final order for review. Before it had arrived, Appellant served
a counter claim and petition to grant permission to amend to add counter
claim. The Petition was filed on March 3, 2003 with the court. Court didn't
sign final order until March 19, 2003 but stated that the court had previously
entered a final judgment and denied petition to grant permission to amend.
The fact that the petition was filed almost twenty days before courts filing of
final order, should have allowed Appellant to have his petition to amend
heard before the court and as such there would have still been more issues
for the court, and as such final order and judgment were not proper
determination to the case. Appellate recognizes that court has right to grant
permission to amend or to deny such, but in this case court abused its
discretion by allowing several steps required by Rules of Civil Procedure to
be circumvented.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the Trial courts decisions should be overturned for
several reasons. Court should rule that wrongful lien was not proper
disposition to this case. If court does grant Appellant request to rule
wrongful lien section not appropriate disposition to case, then all other
issues are moot and case should be remanded back to trial court for decisions
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on remaining issues. If Appellate court does affirm the trial courts decision
to declare lien wrongful, then there are still several remaining issues
including amount of damages from wrongful lien statute, issue of attorneys
fees, as well as procedural issues that prejudiced Appellant in his defense of
case. For these reasons Appellant again argues that case should be
remanded back to district court and remaining issues should be resolved
including granting Appellant permission to amend claim to include counter
claim, which has already been filed with the court.
Respectfully Submitted this / / Day of November, 2003

Earl Cline
Appellant (Pro Se)
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was hand delivered this, _^^aay of November, 2003 to:
Shawn Turner
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, UT 84095
466-6464
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Exhibits
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien -- What may be attached.
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications,
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property.
38-1-5. Priority -- Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of,
the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to
the time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work
begun, or first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and
which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.
38-1-7. Notice of claim -- Contents — Recording -- Service on owner of
property.
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days
from the date:
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment
or material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section
38-11-102; or
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(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as
defined in Section 38-11-102.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting
forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of
the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to
whom the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the
first and last equipment or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification;
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien
claimant;
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized
agent;
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter
3, Recording of Documents; and
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section
38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section
38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in
accordance with Section 38-11-107.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is
not required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24,
1989.
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant
shall deliver or mail by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to:
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or
(ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of
the record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last
completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected
property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or
record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and
attorneys1 fees against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to
enforce the lien.
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make
rules governing the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h).
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38-1-28. Notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security.
(1) The owner of any interest in real property which is subject to a
mechanics' lien recorded under this chapter, or any original contractor or
subcontractor affected by the lien, who disputes the correctness or validity of
the lien may, either before or after the commencement of an action to
enforce the lien, record a notice of release of lien and substitution of
alternate security, which meets the requirements of Subsection (2), in the
office of the county recorder where the lien was recorded.
(2) A notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security
recorded under Subsection (1) shall meet the requirements for the recording
of documents in Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents, shall
reference the lien sought to be released, and shall have as an attachment a
surety bond or evidence of a cash deposit which:
(a) (i) if a surety bond, is executed by a surety company which is treasury
listed, A-rated by AM Best Company, and authorized to issue surety bonds
in this state; or
(ii) if evidence of a cash deposit, meets the requirements established by
rule by the Department of Commerce in accordance with Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act;
(b) is in an amount equal to 150% of the amount claimed by the lien
claimant in connection with the parcel of real property sought to be released;
(c) is made payable to the lien claimant;
(d) is conditioned for the payment of the judgment which would have
been rendered against the property in the action to enforce the lien together
with any costs and attorneys1 fees awarded by the court; and
(e) has as principal the owner of the interest in the real property, or the
original contractor or subcontractor affected by the lien.
(3) Upon the recording of the notice of release of lien and substitution of
alternate security under Subsection (1), the real property described in the
notice shall be released from the mechanics1 lien to which the notice applies.
(4) (a) Upon the recording of a notice of release of lien and substitution
of alternate security under Subsection (1), the person recording the notice
shall cause a copy of the notice, together with any attachments, to be served
within 30 days upon the lien claimant.
(b) If a suit is pending to foreclose the lien at the time the notice is served
upon the lien claimant under Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall,
within 90 days from the receipt of the notice, institute proceedings to add the
alternate security as a party to the lien foreclosure suit.
(5) The alternate security attached to a notice of release of lien shall be
discharged and released upon:
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(a) the failure of the lien claimant to commence a suit against the
alternate security within the same time as an action to enforce the lien under
Section 38-1-11;
(b) the failure of the lien claimant to institute proceedings to add the
alternate security as a party to a lien foreclosure suit within the time required
by Subsection (4)(b); or
(c) the dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosure suit or suit against the
alternate security as to the lien claimant or the entry of judgment against the
lien claimant in such a suit.
(6) If a copy of the notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate
security is not served upon the lien claimant as provided in Subsection
(4)(a), the lien claimant shall have six months after the discovery of the
notice to commence an action against the alternate security, except that no
action may be commenced against the alternate security after two years from
the date the notice was recorded.
38-9-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in
the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in
certain real property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner,
titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and
interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's records for the
county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest
in certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records
for the county in which the property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it
is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
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(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner
of the real property.
38-9-2. Scope.
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9-5, and 389-6 apply to any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a
lien pursuant to this chapter on or after May 5, 1997.
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of
record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed.
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a
lis pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief
permitted by law.
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens.
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien -- Damages.
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county
recorder against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any
actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or
correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request
from a record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or
mailed to the last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to
that record interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever
is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney
fees and costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a
wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county
recorder against the real property, knowing or having reason to know that
the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
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SHAWN D. TURNER (5813)
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 95921
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B
South Jordan, Utah 84095
(801) 446-6464
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the
Edson F. Packer Trust and SHARON B.
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B.
Packer Trust
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

:

vs.

:

EARL CLINEII
Defendant

:

Civil No. 020500239
Judge Donald J. Eyre

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. On
November 27, 2002 a hearing was held on the Plaintiffs Motion. At the hearing the Court
considered the pleadings filed with the Court, the testimony of the Defendant, and the argument of
Plaintiffs counsel. Based on the evidence presented through the hearing and the prior hearing on
the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant had filed an unlawful lien, the Court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
As this matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court accepts for purposes of the Motion only, the properly sworn and supported statements of
the Defendant as true. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds the following material
facts to be undisputed.

1.

Plaintiffs, Edson and Sharon Packer are Trustees of the respective Trusts which are the
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action.

2.

The Defendant is an individual, who at all times relevant to these proceedings was the
son-in-law of the individual Plaintiffs.

3.

The Defendant and the Plaintiffs daughter are currently involved in a divorce proceeding.

4.

On the 12th day of April, 2002, the Defendant filed a document entitled "mechanic's lien"
with the Wasatch County Recorder, against property owned by the Plaintiffs in the
amount of $70,000.00.

5.

The document purporting to be a mechanic's lien was invalid on its face as it failed to set
forth the statutorily required elements and was untimely filed.

6.

The purported mechanic's lien was also invalid due to the Defendant's failure to comply
with the notice requirements of the mechanic's lien statute, including notice to the
Plaintiffs of the steps they could take to have the lien removed.

7.

Plaintiffs made demand on the Defendant pursuant to UCA §38-9-4 to release the lien.

8.

A period in excess of 20 days passed from the mailing of the letter and the Defendant
failed to remove the lien.

9.

The Defendant alleges the lien was for the value of a mural painted on a wall in the home
owned by the Plaintiffs.

10.

The Defendant has failed to produce a single receipt or other documentary item
supporting his claim for the lien amount of $70,000.00.
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11.

The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant performed no work on the mural, but rather
that the work was done by their daughter. The Defendant has alleged that he performed a
nominal amount of labor on the mural

12.

The Defendant has failed to establish what work, if any, he performed on the mural or the
value of that service by any legitimate means, he has failed to identify when the work was
allegedly performed, or how he derived a value for his services.

13.

The Defendant alleges that he is entitled to a lien on the basis that the work was
performed by his wife and that he supported his wife in her actions through such items as
providing her transportation to her parent's home and his babysitting of their children
while she worked on the mural.

14.

Under oath the Defendant stated that the purpose of the lien was not to recover the money
from his in-laws but instead to "protect" the Defendant from a claim that his in-laws
might have been making on his residence as part of the forth coming divorce between the
Defendant and his wife.

15.

The Plaintiffs in their complaint sought recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, the
wrongful lien statute, and under a general claim for punitive damages.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing facts the Court enters the following conclusions of law.

1.

Because the "mechanic's lien" filed by the Defendant was invalid on its face it was not a
mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah law.

2.

The lien as filed constituted a wrongful lien as set forth in UCA §38-9-1 et. seq.
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3.

The Court finds that the Defendant knew the lien was a wrongful lien and further that the
lien contained material misstatements and constituted a false claim pursuant to UCA §389-4 (3) and accordingly the Plaintiffs are awarded damages in the amount of $3,000.00
against the Defendant.

4.

The wrongful lien statute also provides for the recovery by the successful party of its
costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds that the costs incurred by the Plaintiffs which
are recoverable in this action are lUJ*
Plaintiffs a r e ^ ^ / ' ^ (

and the attorney's fees to be awarded to the

, including the $750.00 of attorney's fees previously awarded by

the Court.
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff was obligated to elect its remedy between the two
statutory schemes of the mechanic's lien statute or the wrongful lien statute. The Court
further finds that by electing to have the hearing on the Plaintiffs Petition to Nullify Lien
the Plaintiffs elected their remedy under that statutory scheme and are therefore barred
from pursuing additional claims under the mechanic's lien statute.

6.

The Court further finds that based on the facial invalidity of the document purporting to
be a mechanic's lien in this action that the document so filed did not constitute a
mechanic's lien pursuant to statute and accordingly the wrongful lien statute was the only
remedy available

7.

The Court finds that the penalty provisions contained within UCA §38-9-4 constitute a
form of punitive damages thereby precluding the award of additional punitive damages in
this matter.
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Although the Defendant has made no motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that
its determination that the Plaintiffs cannot recover under the mechanic's lien statute by
virtue of the previous conclusions of law above, together with the Court's ruling on the
damages involved in the wrongful lien statute result in the resolution of all issues present
in this litigation. Accordingly this Order and Judgment constitutes the final Order and
Judgment in the above-referenced litigation.

JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing, Judgment is awarded against the Defendant Earl Cline II in the
amount of ffityo/O *

consisting of statutory damages of $3,000.00, recoverable costs int

the amount of /(Jjx

and attorneys fees in the amount of^>y

/ ^
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4th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EDSON F PACKER,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENTS

vs.

Case No: 020500239 PR

EARL CLINE II,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

DONALD J. EYRE
November 27, 2 002

roseb

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): EDSON F PACKER
Defendant(s): EARL II CLINE
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): SHAWN D TURNER
Audio
Tape Count: 10:04

HEARING
Opening statements by Mr. Turner regarding the motion for summary
j udgment.
Response by Mr. Cline.
Response by Mr. Turner.
Defendant addressed the issues presented by Mr. Turner.
It is the findings of the Court that the motion for summary
judgment is denied.

Page 1 (last)

Earl Cline
(In Pro Per)
1565E7200 S
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
568-2570

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY

EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the
Edson F. Packer trust and SHARON B.
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B.
Packer Trust

AFFIDAVIT OF EARL CLINE

Plaintiff
Vs.
Civil #020500239
Judge Donald J. Eyre
Earl L. Cline II
Defendant (filed in pro per)

Earl L. Cline, having been duly sworn does hereby depose and say:
1.

I am above 21 years of age and a defendant in the above named action.

2.

The Plaintiff(s) are my father and mother in law through my marriage to their
daughter.

3.

My wife and I are currently involved in a divorce action which wasfiledby my wife
on April 11,2002.

4.

Plaintiff(s) and myself are involved in numerous disputes related to the division of
marital assets as well alleged loans that Plaintiff(s) have purported to have made to
me as well as work done on their personal home by myself and my wife.

5.

On March 24, 2002 My brother and I were retrieving some business items from my
home and my wife Julie started to give me a hard time about all the supposed "debt"
that we had. I made the comment that aside from a couple of credit cards and a
couple of disputed medical debts, that we didn't really owe that much money. Julie
responded that she had just signed some sort of loan document with her father and
their attorney that stated all the money as well as down payment they had given us
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for the house and the van they gave us several years ago were loans and that he was
going to have me pay back half of them in the future divorce action. She told me that
he had kept track of things and they had-gjri*MS over $100,000 since the beginning
of our marriage.
^ c ! ^ / &/
6.

Shortly thereafter but before the filing of the divorce I calculated the time since we
had last performed labor on their home to determine if I still had Um rights for the
work my wife and I had done on the home and it turned our that they had not yet
expired.

7.

The lien I filed was before the divorce action was filed, and was not done to "punish
the Packers for supporting their daughter" as was alleged.

8.

Subsequent to the original lien filing one of the Plaintiff(s) neighbors called and said
that the legal description I used to file the lien was including property that Plaintiff(s)
had sold to other parties and asked if I would remove it from their property. I went
up the next day to change the legal description, but the lady at the recorders office
asked if I could release the lien and file a new one with the proper legal description. I
did as she requested.

9.

On or about September 24, 2002 I received an envelope from Shawn Turner
(plaintiff(s) Council) certified mail which contained several documents including a
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment. Attached to the
Memorandum was a copy of Plaintiff s First Set Of Interrogatories And Request For
Admissions. The last page of the Interrogatories was a signature page signed by
Shawn Turner himself and dated August 15, 2002. There was not a Mailing
Certificate attached to the document.

10.

This is the first time that I have seen this request for Interrogatorties. If they had
been mailed to me in the past I never received them.

11.

I have personally done work and provided materials on the painting in the Plaintiff(s)
home.

12.

My wife has also done work on the Plaintiff(s) home and had used marital assets to
procure supplies and materials to do the work.

13.

I had been told on several occasions by both my wife and also Mrs. Packer that we
would be paid for the work in the mural and other work in the home when it was
finished.

FURTHER RESPONDENT SAYETH NOT
Dated the

day of October, 2002

/

><£*

J^

Earl Cline
(In Pro Per)
1565 E 7200 S
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
568-2570

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY

EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the
Edson F. Packer trust and SHARON B.
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B.
Packer Trust

RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS FIRST REQUEST
FOR INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff
Vs.
Civil #020500239
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Earl L. Cline II
Defendant (filed in pro per)

Defendant here by submits'the attached answers to the Plaintiff(s) request for
Interrogatories.
Answers to "Request For Admissions"
1.
Admit there is'ao written contract between you and any of the Plaintiffs with
respect to the mural painted in Plaintiff s home.
1.

Admit.

2.
Admit there was no verbal contract between yourself and any of the Plaintiffs
respecting the mural in Plaintiff s home.
2.

Deny. Before Julie left for Salt Lake in July of 1999,1 had told her that we
couldn't afford for her to go back to Salt Lake. Julie got on the phone and her
mother told her that She would pay Julie to paint a Mural so she could afford
to come home.
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In October 1999 Julie asked me if she could go home and finish the Mural. I
spoke with Sharon on the phone and she told me that "as soon as Julie finishes
the Mural we can pay you kids for it and I know that you could really use the
money". £ f U o j J L U ^ ^
* i J> U
<? : lo *> ^ * ^
In Sept. 2001,1 told Edson that I could come up to Bear Lake and help them
clean out the cabin. Sharon said "I think it would be better if you (Earl)
stayed over the weekend and watched the children because then Julie can
spend the weekend painting the fireplace and working on the stenciling." She
then said "We can pay you for the work after you are done and you kids could
really use the money right now".
3.
Admit you did not provide $705300.00 worth of materials and/or labor on the
mural located in Plaintiff s home.
3.

Deny. The $70,300 was for the full value of the painting after it was completed.

4.
Admit you knew that you had not provided $70,300.00 worth of labor and/or
materials on the mural in Plaintiffs home at the time that you filed the mechanic's lien
that is the subject matter of this action.
4. Deny. The value of the painting was derived from statements made by Sharon
Packer and Julie Cline in Sept. 2001.
5.
Admit the document attached hereto as exhibit" A ", is a true and correct copy of
the document you created and filed with the Wasatch County Recorder.
5.

Admit. This is the second lien. The first lien was released because I had the
wrong legal description and the county recorders office asked me to file a new
lien with the right description.

6.
Admit that you filed the original of the document designated as exhibit" A " with
the Wasatch County Recorder's Office.
6.
7.

Admit.
Admit you received the original of the letter attached hereto as exhibit "8"

7.

Admit.

8.
Admit that after receiving this letter you did fail to cause the lien to be released
within the time frame demanded by the letter.
8.

Admit.
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9.
Admit that you are currently a party in a divorce action with Julie Cline, the
daughter of Plaintiffs, Edson and Sharon Packer.
9.

Admit.

10.
Admit that you filed the mechanic's lien against the Packer's property after the
divorce proceedings had been initiated.
10.

Deny.
The original lien was filed on or about March 22,2002. The
divorce was not filed until April 11, 2002.

11.
Admit you filed the mechanic's lien in an attempt to harass and punish the
Packer's and/or to coerce them into pressuring Julie Cline into making concessions in the
divorce proceeding.
11.

Deny.
It was filed because Julie told me that her father had made her sign
papers that stated that every bit of money that they had given to us throughout
our marriage was all loans and that they were going to ask the Judge to have
me re-pay them through the impending divorce action.

Responses to "Interrogatories"

1.
Identify each individual providing answers to these interrogatories or whom you
consulted in order to answer these interrogatories.

1.

Just Myself.

2.
Identify any labor you claim to have provided on the mural located in the Packer's
home by providing the following information:
a.

The dates on which you provided any labor.

b.

The specific tasks that you took constituting that labor.

C.

The amount of time you spent employed on those tasks on each individual date.

2.

a. Summer 1999, trips to Wall Mart to buy paint and supplies. Watching the
children for the weekend so she could stay and paint. Julie spent much of the
summer working on the painting. During Christmas 1999 through Feb. 2000 I
spent several nights and or days helping her with various parts of the painting.
During Summer 2000,1 spent several days with Julie purchasing supplies and
preparing for the trip to Houston where she was going to learn to paint the
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ment. The Atkinsons refused both of
these proposals, opting instead to obtain an
immediate settlement.
Furthermore, the trial court questioned
the Atkinsons extensively regarding their
comprehension of Chad's condition and the
implications of the settlement:
THE COURT: Do you understand that
by settling this case, and regardless of
what later transpires, when you find out
later that the child's injury is worse than
you anticipated, and on the other hand
even if it's better, that you will not ever
be able to come back against Intermountain Health Care? Do you understand
that?
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir, I do.
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the probate hearing was conducted in a jurisprudential manner and that
the Atkinsons participated with full knowledge of Chad's rights and the implications
of their actions upon any future causes of
action against IHC or Wetzel
Furthermore, the release signed by the
Atkinsons was done with full knowledge of
Chad's rights, which has the effect of barring this cause of action. The release
signed by the Atkinsons acquits IHC and
their agent, Wetzel,
from any and all claims, actions, causes
of action, demands, rights, damages,
costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever . . . on account of
or in any way growing out of any and all
known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries . . .
resulting or to result from the accident
We affirm the trial court's determination
that, as a matter of law, no genuine issue
of material fact exists with regard to the
Atkinsons' allegations of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.17 We have duly
considered the Atkinsons' other claims and
find them to be without merit.
Affirmed.
17. The rule on summary judgment may apply
even when some fact remains in dispute, we
affirm summary judgment when all material

HOWE, Associate, C.J., and
STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ. concur.
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ium complex was constructed and failed to
allocate separate amounts to be different
units; (3) one financial institution was
properly added as party defendant after
expiration of period for commencing mechanic's lien action; and (4) trial court properly declined to consider evidence of parties' intent when construing recorded mechanic's lien release.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

1. Appeal and Error <S=>863, 934(1)
In determining whether trial court
properly granted summary judgment, Supreme Court must review facts in light
most favorable to losing party, review trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness,
and give no particular deference to trial
court's view of the law.
2. Mechanics' Liens <®=>116
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory,
and lien claimants may only acquire lien by
complying with statutory provisions authorizing them.
3. Mechanics' Liens <§=>126
Failure to comply with statutory requirements for notice of mechanic's lien
will be viewed as technical, and lien will be
upheld in absence of any prejudice, unless
failures have compromised a purpose of
mechanic's lien statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-17, 38-1-8.
4. Mechanics' Liens e=>154(6)
Strict compliance with notary public
statute is not required to satisfy notice
verification requirement of mechanic's lien
statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8.
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=>154(6)
Jurat on mechanic's lien notice, which
contained notary's signature, the date, and
her official seal, substantially complied
with verification requirement of mechanics
n
^n statute and with notary statute, and
thus fact that notary failed to include her
a
ddress and commission expiration date did
n
°t invalidate notice. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7,
46-1-8.

6. Mechanics' Liens <^>154(6)
Even if jurat on mechanic's lien notice
must conform with notary statute, substantial compliance would be sufficient. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8.
7. Mechanics' Liens ®=>136(2)
In determining adequacy of property
description in mechanic's lien notice, court's
main purpose is to determine whether notice adequately informed other claimants of
existence of lien and whether other claimants were prejudiced, as matter of law, by
the descriptive terms. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7.
8. Mechanics' Liens e=>136(2)
For competing claimants to prevail on
allegation that property description in mechanic's lien notice was inadequate, claimants would have to show that they were
somehow misled or prejudiced, and it would
not be enough for them to show that other
persons might have been prejudiced by lien
notice. U.C.A 1953, 38-1-7.
9. Mechanics' Liens <&=>149(4)
Mechanic's lien notice was not invalid,
at least against competing claimants, simply because lienor failed to segregate contract amounts attributable to individual
condominium units, where one party was
apparently the only owner of affected property when lien attached, and competing
claimants did not argue that notice misled
them as to claimed lien, nor did they demonstrate any prejudice from aggregation of
claims. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 38-1-8.
10. Mechanics' Liens <§=>157(3)
Mechanic's lien would not be invalidated merely because it overdescribed property upon which lien could properly attach,
where there was no evidence that description was fraudulent, and competing claimants did not argue that they were misled or
prejudiced by description. U.C.A.1953, 381-7.
11. Libel and Slander <s=>130
Inclusion of additional property in mechanic's lien notices would subject lienor to
appropriate relief in slander of title action.
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12. Mechanics' Liens <§=>157(3)
Mechanic's lien would not be invalidated as to competing claimants even if notice
described property which was not even
owed by owner at time that work was
commenced on project, where court could
determine what part of property was actually subject to lien, and competing claimants did not complain that they were actually misled or prejudiced by notice. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-7.
13. Mechanics' Liens <^149(1)
Mechanic's lien notice may aggregate
claims arising under more than one contract.
14. Mechanics' Liens <£=>157(1)
Lienor's inclusion of claims arising under two separate contracts in single mechanic's lien notice did not invalidate lien;
competing claimants did not argue that notice failed to adequately notify them of
existence of lien or in any way prejudiced
them.
15. Mechanics' Liens <&=>149(4)
Mechanic's lien notice was not invalid
under Condominium Ownership Act, which
provides that no lien shall arise or be effective against property subsequent to recording of declaration, even though contractor
filed mechanic's lien describing entire property on which condominium complex was
constructed subsequent to filing of condominium declarations and failed to allocate
specific amounts to different units; only
effect under statute of intermediate filing
of declarations was to make lien proportionately effective against each unit constructed under contract and each unit's corresponding undivided interest in common
area. U.C.A.1953, 57-8-19.
16. Mechanics' Liens <^260(6), 268
Statute requiring mechanic's lien
claimant to commence lien action and
record lis pendens within 12 months after
completion of original contract or suspension of work thereunder is not statute of
limitations; penalty for not commencing
action to enforce lien within 12-month period is invalidation of lien rather than preclusion of claim as with traditional statute of
limitation. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11.

17. Mechanics' Liens <s^268
Mechanic's lienor's timely recordation
of lis pendens imparts constructive notice
to all persons concerned with property of
action to enforce lien, regardless of whether they were named as parties or had actual knowledge of action. U.C.A.1953, 38-111, 78-40-2.
18. Mechanics' Liens <s=*263(10)
Commencement of mechanic's lien
foreclosure action within 12 months after
completion of original contract or suspension of work thereunder preserves lien as
to all interested parties even if not named
as party to that action. U.C.A.1953, 38-111.
19. Mechanics' Liens <®=>268
Only when mechanic's lienor fails to
timely record lis pendens can interested
person argue that it is not subject to mechanic's lien, and then only if such person
was not named as party to foreclosure action and did not have actual knowledge of
action. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11.
20. Mechanics' Liens <s^264(l)
Financial institution holding deeds of
trust was subject to mechanic's lien, where
contractor commenced foreclosure action
and filed lis pendens within required 12month period after completion of contract
or suspension of work thereunder, and thus
financial institution could properly be
joined by appropriate amendment to complaint even after expiration of 12-month
period. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11.
21. Evidence <s=*397(l)
If contract is clear on its face, trial
court need not, and in fact should not,
consider evidence" of contrary meaning.
22. Mechanics' Liens <®=>236
Trial court properly declined to consider evidence of parties' intent when construing recorded mechanic's lien release, where
language of release was susceptible of no
other interpretation but that two condominiums were completely released from scope
of lien.
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23. Mechanics' Liens <s=>236
Use of word "partial" with respect to
partial release of mechanic's lien did not
create ambiguity which would allow trial
court to consider evidence of parties' intent
when construing release, where release
clearly was "partial" because it only released two of eight condominium units otherwise coveWd by lien notice.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

24. Appeal and Error ^ 1 7 7
Supreme Court would not consider
whether attorney fees should be awarded
to claimant which prevailed in mechanic's
lien foreclosure action brought by competing claimant, where claimant had not requested attorney fees as part of its motion
for summary judgment, which trial court
had granted. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18.
Ellen Maycock, Robert F. Babcock, and
Darrel J. Bostwick, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Jon C. Heaton and James Boevers, Salt
Lake City, for Copper State Thrift & Loan
Co., Valley Bank & Trust Co., Cottonwood
Thrift & Loan Co., and Western Sav. &
Loan Co.
Jeffrey M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for
Copper State.
Dennis V. Haslam and Kathy A. F.
Davis, Salt Lake City, for Cottonwood
Thrift.
Steven D. Crawley, Salt Lake City, for
Bradshaw Development Co.
Richard H. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for
Metier.
Matthew F. Hilton, Draper, for Stringfellow and Highland Orchards.
Allen Sims and Gary E. Doctorman, Salt
Lake City, for Hugo F. Diederick.
Richard A. Rappaportl, Salt Lake City,
for Carolyn L. Nielsen.
Julian D. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for
Brent Ivie Elec, Inc.
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for Dese
ret Pacific Mortg. and Scott A. Kafesjian.

GREGORY K. ORME, Court of
Appeals Judge:
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a
summary judgment invalidating its mechanic's lien against the interests of Copper
State Thrift & Loan Company, Valley Bank
& Trust Company, and Cottonwood Thrift
& Loan Company, Inc. We affirm the summary judgment as to Cottonwood Thrift,
but reverse as to Copper State and Valley
Bank.
I. FACTS
Bradshaw Development Company, Inc.
("Bradshaw"), owned a parcel of land, the
Highland Orchards property, which it
planned to develop into the Highland Orchards Condominium project. The property was divided into two parcels with the
objective of constructing condominiums in
two phases—phase I and phase II. Phase
I, when completed, would consist of eighteen condominium units. Bradshaw engaged Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Projects")
to construct some of the phase I units. In
September 1982, Bradshaw and Projects
entered into a contract for the construction
of two units—FF-6-A1 and FF-6-B1, hereinafter referred to as units 1 and 2. Those
parties entered into a second contract in
April 1983 concerning the contruction of
six additional units—FF-5-A1, FF-5-B1,
FF-U-A1, FF-11-A2, FF-11-B1, and FF11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3
through 8, respectively. The contracts allocated prices on a per-unit basis.
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company
financed construction of the eight units.
The Copper State loan to Bradshaw was
secured by two trust deeds. The first deed
was recorded in December 1982 and covered units 1 and 2. The second deed was
recorded in June 1983 and covered units 3
through 8.
Relying on the terms of its loan agreement with Bradshaw, Copper State refused
to advance additional funds to Bradshaw in
June 1983. Sometime thereafter, Bradshaw stopped making payments to
Projects. On October 7, 1983, Projects
ceased construction with a substantial balance still owing to Projects. Bradshaw did
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not record its condominium declaration until August 1983.
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3
were sold. The sales of units 1 and 2 were
financed by Valley Bank & Trust Company,
which recorded trust deeds on those units
in May 1983. Copper State subordinated
its December 1982 trust deed to the May
1983 trust deeds of Valley Bank. The sale
of unit 3 was financed by Western Savings
& Loan Company, which is not a party to
this appeal. After construction was halted,
units 4 and 5 were sold. The sales of these
units were financed by Cottonwood Thrift
& Loan Company and secured by trust
deeds recorded in December 1983.
In November 1983, Projects recorded a
notice of mechanic's lien against the Highland Orchards property. The notice described Bradshaw as the owner of the subject property. The lien notice described the
property by a metes and bounds description
including all of the phase I and phase II
property.1 The notice did not describe the
eight constructed units, by employing their
descriptions as used in the condominium
declaration or otherwise, nor did it allocate
unpaid amounts attributable to each unit.
The notice did not distinguish between
work performed under the September 1982
and April 1983 contracts. The notice of
lien cited the construction starting date as
October 10, 1982, and the ending date as
October 7, 1983. Although the notice of
lien contained the signature and seal of a
notary and the date of notarization, it did
not give the notary's address or commission expiration date.
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to release from the lien units 4 and 5, financed
by Cottonwood Thrift. The lien release
specifically stated that units 4 and 5 were
released from the scope of the lien in exchange for the payment of $90,000. Thereafter, Projects filed an amended notice of
lien. The amended notice was essentially
identical to the initial notice except that
$85,000 was added to the "credits and off1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds description was not confined to the property on which
the eight units constructed by Projects were
located. However, it appears from the record

sets" figure and subtracted from the "balance owing" figure. The same metes and
bounds description was used to describe
the property. The amended notice did not
exempt units 4 and 5 from the property
description, but attached to it were a map
of the entire condominium project and a
copy of the partial release.
Projects commenced an action to foreclose the lien and recorded a lis pendens in
March 1984. The complaint alleged that
Bradshaw had breached its contracts with
Projects. The complaint also called for a
determination of priorities among the various claimants. Valley Bank was not
named as a defendant in the complaint but
had actual knowledge of the action at least
by August 1984, when it reviewed a title
report showing Projects' lis pendens and
initiated relevant correspondence with
Projects. On May 24, 1985, almost twenty
months after it ceased construction,
Projects filed an amended complaint which
joined Valley Bank and others as defendants. Bradshaw failed to answer either
complaint, and a default judgment was entered against it in December 1985.
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley
Bank, and Western Savings ("the Banks")
moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. They collectively argued
that Projects' lien was invalid under the
mechanic's lien statute and under the Condominium Ownership Act. Essentially,
their arguments under the mechanic's lien
statute were that (1) the jurat lacked the
notary's address and the date her commission expired, (2) the notice describes more
property than was actually subject to the
lien, (3) the notice describes property which
Bradshaw initially did not own, and (4) the
lien did not distinguish between work performed under the September 1982 and
April 1983 contracts. The Banks also argued that the Condominium Ownership Act
required Projects to file a separate lien on
each condominium unit as described in the
condominium declaration.
that the only new structures on any part of the
Highland Orchards property were the units constructed by Projects.
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Valley Bank also argued that Projects
had failed to„join it as a defendant within
the statutorily prescribed time and was
therefore barred from later amending its
complaint to add that bank as a defendant.
Moreover, Cottonwood Thrift argued that
it was not a proper party to the suit because Projects had released the units it
financed from the scope of the lien.
Projects filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment on its claim against
Copper State, its construction lender.
The trial court granted the Banks' summary judgment motions and denied
Projects' motion. The court concluded that
(1) Projects had unequivocally released
from the lien's coverage the units financed
by Cottonwood Thrift, (2) Projects failed to
join Valley Bank as a party within the
required time, and (3) the lien was invalid
due to improper notarization "and on
grounds otherwise set forth in the moving
defendants' memoranda on file."
On appeal, Projects challenges each of
the trial court's conclusions. Primarily, it
argues that Utah does not require a lien
notarization to contain the notary's address
and/or commission expiration date.
The Banks assert the same arguments on
appeal that they asserted in the trial court.
In particular, they argue that we should
affirm the trial court's decision on the notarization issue. Moreover, the Banks assert
that, even assuming we were to agree with
Projects on the notarization issue, we can
and should affirm the summary judgment
due to other failures in the lien notice.
And indeed, "we may affirm trial court
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite
the trial court's having assigned another
reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co.
* UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988); see also State v. One 1979 Pontiac
Trans Am, 111 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah Ct.App.
W89). The Banks also cross-appeal, seekln
g an award of attorney fees in the district court and on appeal.
2

- The Banks do not argue that Projects completely failed to comply with any of the particu-

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] "Summary judgment is proper only
when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power
& Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990);
see Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). In our determination of whether the trial court properly
granted summary judgment, we must review the facts in the light most favorable
to the losing party. E.g., Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Moreover, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and give no particular deference to that court's view of the
law. Id.
III. MECHANIC'S LIENS
GENERALLY
We begin our analysis by recognizing
that "[t]he purpose of the mechanic's lien
act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen
who have added directly to the value of the
property of another by their materials or
labor." Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On the other
hand, we recognize that liens create "an
encumbrance on property that deprives the
owner of his ability to convey clear title
and impairs his credit/' First Sec. Mtg. Co.
v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981), a
fact the importance of which is magnified
by the pre-recordation priority accorded a
valid mechanic's lien. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-5 (1988). State legislatures and
courts attempt to balance these competing
interests through their mechanic's lien statutes and judicial interpretations thereof.
[2] Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may only acquire a
lien by complying with the statutory provisions authorizing them. Utah Sav. &
Loan Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335,
338, 366 P.2d 598, 600 (1961). However,
Utah courts have recognized that substantial compliance with these provisions is all
that is required.2 Chase v. Dawson, 117
lar requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7
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Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950); see
also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660
P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we
have stated that "[a] lien once acquired by
labor performed on a building with the
consent of the owner should not . . . be
defeated by technicalities, when no rights
of others are infringed, and no express
command of the statute is disregarded."
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241,
249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906) (quoting 20 Am.
& Eng. Encyclopedia of Law 276); see also
Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561,
563 (Utah 1989). Courts from other states
also subscribe to this view. See, e.g., H.A.
M.S Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977);
Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776,
781 (Wyo.1986).
Although courts have differing opinions
about how liberally to construe provisions
within their mechanic's lien statutes, "the
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary
rules which have no demonstrable value in
a particular fact situation."3 Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec.
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 380, 537

>P.2d 80, 83 (1975). Utah has followed this
Arend both in the legislature and in the
[courts. A legislative example of this trend
]s the 1985 amendment to section 38-1-7 of
pie mechanic's lien statute. The 1985
^amendment greatly simplified the mechanic's lien notice, dispensing with several of
me more cumbersome lien notice requirements. 4 One judicial example of this trend
is Mickelsen, in which this court clarified
the lien verification process and dispensed
with the notion that the claimant's verification required any formal ritual. 767 P.2d
at 563.

(1983) Rather, they argue that Projects' efforts
did not substantially comply with the statutes.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp 1990). Requirements under the 1984 version of this provision which are no longer part of the statute
include actual verification of the statements in
the lien notice, "a statement of [the claimant's]
demand after deducting all just credits and offsets
[, and] a statement of the terms, time
given and conditions of his contract
" Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983)

3. This trend is not confined to this area of the
law but can be seen in others as well. See, eg,
Tech-Fluid Servs, Inc v. Gavilan Operating,
Inc, 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah CtAppl990)
In
Tech-Fluid, the Utah Court of Appeals took a
similar position in the area of redemption The
court concluded that where the provisions in
the redemption statute are "procedural in nature and do not affect any substantive rights of
the purchaser
[substantial] compliance is all
that is necessary" Id at 1334
4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides
in pertinent part
(2) This notice shall contain a statement set
ting forth the following information
(a) the name of the reputed owner if
known or, if not known, the name of the
record owner,
(b) the name of the person by whom he
was employed or to whom he furnished the
equipment or material,
(c) the time when the first and last labor or
service was performed or the first and last
equipment or material was furnished,
(d) a description of the property, sufficient
for identification, and
(e) the signature of the hen claimant or his
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate

[3] With these general principles in
mind, we turn to the particular arguments
in this case. We must determine whether
the rigorous interpretations urged by the
Banks are necessary to protect the interests of the parties in the instant situation.
Unless we find that Projects' alleged failures have compromised a purpose of the
mechanic's lien statute, those failures will
be viewed as technical, and in the absence
of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.5

5. It is important to emphasize the scope of this
opinion. Our focus is of course upon the particular parties and particular facts in this case, but
it is further narrowed by the "as a matter of
law" standard implicit in reviewing summary
judgments It may well be that the same lien
notices would have worked significant prejudice
on other parties not before us, such as owners
of, or lenders secured by, the phase II parcel to
which Projects had no valid claim Thus it is
entirely possible that we would invalidate this
same notice as it applied to another party who
could demonstrate prejudice Cf Horseshoe Estates v 2M Co., 713 P2d 776, 781 (Wyo.1986)
(holding hen sufficient as against party who
failed to demonstrate prejudice o& that it was
misled) It is even conceivable thst the Banks,
or some of them, could demonstrate actual prejudice in the context of a trial. At this juncture,
however, we only consider the Banks' conten
tion that the hens are so flawed as to simply be
void, regardless of any actual prejudice.
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IV. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER SECTIONS 38-1-7 AND -8
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's
mechanic's lien ^statute identify the statutory elements op a lien notice. At the time
the dispute arose, section 38-1-7 provided
that every notice of lien recorded with the
county recorder must contain
a notice of intention to hold and claim a
lien, and a statement of his demand after
deducting all just credits and offsets,
with the name of the reputed owner if
known or if not known, the name of the
record owner, and also the name of the
person by whom he was employed or to
whom he furnished the material, with a
statement of the terms, time given and
conditions of his contract, specifying the
time when the first and last labor was
performed, or the first and last material
was furnished, and also a description of
the property to be charged with the lien,
sufficient for identification, which claim
must be verified by the oath of himself
or of some other person.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp.1983).6
Section 38-1-8 provided:
Liens against two or more buildings or
other improvements owned by the same
person may be included in one claim; but
in such case the person filing the claim
must designate the amount claimed to be
due to him on each of such buildings or
other improvements.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988).
A. Failure of the Jurat
At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp.1983) provided that
every notice of lien "must be verified by
the oath of [the lien claimant] or of some
other person." The district court found
that a proper verification under section 381~7 required compliance with Utah Code
Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953), which provided: "To
all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations
and instruments of every kind taken and
certified by a notary public he shall affix to
6

- Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983.
See supra note 4.

'• In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was
held invalid because the lien claimant failed to

his signature his official title and his place
of residence and the date on which his
commission expires." The court then concluded that the notary's failure to include
her address and commission expiration date
in the jurat invalidated the verification,
which made the lien void. We disagree.
Initially, we note that verification is an
essential part of a lien notice and "not a
hypertechnicality that we can discount."
First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d
919, 922 (Utah 1981).7 Verification by the
lien claimant was thought necessary so
that "[fjrivolous, unfounded, and inflated
claims can thereby be minimized, and the
prejudgment property rights of the [property owners] receive their due protection."
Id. Verification accomplishes this purpose
by creating "the possibility of perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien claim."
H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of
Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 264 (Alaska
1977) (lien must be signed by claimant;
corporate acknowledgment insufficient).
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien statute requires verification, Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-7 (Supp.1983), it does not state any
particular procedure for verification.
Those procedures have developed judicially
in cases like First Security Mortgage.
One of the most recent and instructive
cases defining these procedures is Michelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah
1989), decided after the trial court made its
ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed
the essential elements for a proper verification: "(1) [Tjhere must be a correct written
oath or affirmation, and (2) it must be
signed by the affiant in the presence of a
notary or other person authorized to take
oaths, and (3) the latter must affix a proper
jurat." Id. at 564. The Banks do not
contest that an oath was made or that it
was signed before a notary. They simply
argue that the notary failed to affix a
"proper jurat" because she omitted her adsign the oath. The notice was insufficient even
though the notary had signed the certificate.
See also Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C
& A Dev. Co., Ill P.2d 475 (Utah 1989).
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dress and the expiration date of her commission.
[4-6] The Banks would have us adopt a
position requiring strict compliance with
the notary public statute in order to satisfy the verification requirement of the mechanic's lien statute as expounded in Mickelsen. We decline to adopt this position.
A jurat is "merely evidence of the fact that
the oath was properly taken before the
duly authorized officer." 50 C.J.S. Jurat
705 (1947); see also Stern v. Board of
Elections, 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 181, 237
N.E.2d 313, 317 (1968); Craig v. State, 232
Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.E.2d 296, 297 (1953)
(purpose is to evidence that oath was made
before authorized officer). In view of this
principle, because the jurat in this case
clearly evidenced that the oath was given
before a notary, it should be considered
adequate. And even assuming that the
legislature intended the inclusion of a jurat
which conformed with the notary statute,8
substantial compliance would certainly be
sufficient to satisfy that requirement.
E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296,
215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950).

signature to jurat did not invalidate affidavit).
The purpose of the verification requirement is to assure that lien claimants file
legitimate claims. First Sec. Mtg., 631
P.2d at 922; see also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at
264. In First Security Mortgage and H.A.
M.S., liens were held invalid because the
lien notices did not contain the signature of
the claimants but simply the signature of a
notary attesting to the oath of the claimants. Unlike with the notices in those
cases, the president of Projects signed an
oath that the contents of the lien notice
were true and the notary attested to this
fact. We see no policy reason why the
notary's technical failure to include her address and commission expiration date increased, in any way, the likelihood that
Projects would file a frivolous claim, especially since her failure presumably occurred after the verification was signed by
the president.
For the above reasons, we find that the
lien notice substantially complied with the
"proper jurat" requirement established in
Mickelsen.9

In this case, the jurat contained the notary's signature, the date, and her official
seal. These items were sufficient to evidence the fact that the document had been
verified. Moreover, anyone who questioned the validity of the notarization could
certainly confirm its authenticity with the
simplest inquiry. Thus, we find that the
lien's notarization substantially complied
with the mechanic's lien and notary statutes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 103 W.Va. 1, 5, 136
S.E. 399, 401 (1927) (notice sufficient
though notary failed to affix official seal in
contravention of statute); Stern, 237
N.E.2d at 317-19 (failure of notary to affix

B. Other Grounds
Though we disagree with the trial court's
legal conclusion on the notarization issue,
we may still affirm the summary judgment
based upon one of the other failures in the
lien notice. The Banks argue that the lien
notice is invalid because the metes and
bounds description in the notice (1) covers
more than one condominium unit without
specifically referencing each, (2) describes
more property than is actually subject to
the lien, and (3) describes property which
was not initially owned by Bradshaw and
because the notice fails to distinguish between work completed under the two separate contracts.

8. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's lien statute to specifically provide a particular jurat form. The current statute requires "an
acknowledgment or certificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-l-7(2)(e) (Supp.1990).

In Williamson, the bankruptcy court found that
each element listed in section 46-1-8 was an
essential part of a notary's certificate even when
made on a mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah
law was admittedly unclear on this point when
Williamson was decided. Nonetheless, we disagree with the analysis in Williamson and hold
to the contrary.

9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsistent with In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah
1984), on which the trial court heavily relied.
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These other grounds essentially challenge the descriptive contents of the lien
notice. The purpose for descriptive terms
in a lien notice is to adequately inform
interested parties of the existence and
scope of the lien. See Park City Meat Co.
v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah
145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260 (1906); Eccles
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249,
87 P. 713, 717 (1906); see also Parsons v.
Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507
(1923); Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac
Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490,
700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct.App.1985); Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec.
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537
P.2d 80, 82 (1975). Thus, courts look to see
whether interested parties have been informed of the existence of the lien and
whether the lien has misled or prejudiced
those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at 717; see
also Beall, 700 P.2d at 112; Horseshoe
Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo.
1986). When lien notices have sufficiently
informed interested persons that a lien exists on identifiable property and the complaining party has not been misled by the
notice, the purpose of the provisions has
not been thwarted and courts are inclined
to find substantial compliance. See, e.g.,
Horseshoe, 713 P.2d at 781.
[7, 8] As we analyze each of the Banks'
challenges to the lien description, our main
purpose is to determine whether the notice
adequately informed the Banks of the existence of the lien and whether the Banks
were prejudiced, as a matter of lawr, by the
descriptive terms. "Absent any such claim
of prejudice or being misled in any manner
by the description[s] which [appear] in the
lien statement, we [will] hold that it was
sufficient." Id.10
1. Inclusion Of More Than One Unit
Without Designating Each
[9] Section 38-1-7 provides, with our
emphasis, that every notice of lien must
contain "a description of the property to be
charged with the lien, sufficient for identi*0* It is not enough for the Banks to show that
other persons might have been prejudiced by
the lien notice. In order to prevail, the Banks

fication"
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7
(Supp.1983). Section 38-1-8 provides in
pertinent part: "Liens against two or more
buildings . . . owned by the same person or
persons may be included in one claim; but
in such case the person filing the claim
must designate therein the amount claimed
to be due to him on each of such buildings." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988).
The Banks argue that these two sections
require Projects to allocate its contract
claims among all the relevant condominium
units.
We begin our analysis with the first of
three cases dealing with section 38-1-8 and
its predecessor. In Eccles Lumber Co. v.
Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the
owner of property on which a mechanic's
lien had been filed argued that a lien notice
was invalid because it failed to separately
state amounts due on different structures.
This court construed the predecessor statute to section 38-1-8, which contains language identical to that in section 38-1-8,
and definitively stated that a blanket lien
was not invalid for failing to allocate the
amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at 717. The
lien claimant's failure did "not affect nor
concern the owner of the property." Id.
He was "fairly informed of the amount
claimed against his property." Id. Rather, allocation was necessary "to protect the
interests of the lien claimants between and
among themselves." Id.
The next case in which we discussed the
issue was United States Building & Loan
Association v. Midvale Home Finance
Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935).
In Midvale Home, a corporation promoted
the construction and sale of homes in a
subdivision. When the corporation defaulted on its construction loan, the loan company brought suit to foreclose its mortgage
on the subdivision property. We were
called upon to determine the priorities
among the mortgage, several mechanic's
liens, and the interests of the individual
home purchasers. The home purchasers
argued that they had priority over the lien
must show that they were somehow misled or
prejudiced. See supra note 5.
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claimants because the lien claimants did
not allocate amounts due on the various
houses constructed in the subdivision. The
purchasers attempted to distinguish Eccles
on the basis that Eccles involved only the
original owner. We rejected this argument, concluding that the mechanic's liens
"attached before any of the claims of the
unit holders." Id. at 519, 44 P.2d at 1096.
The final case in which we dealt with this
subject was Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d
598 (1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a
lien covering numerous subdivision lots.
Some of the lots were owned by the Mechams, and some, by another individual.
The lien failed to allocate the amounts due
on each lot. Mecham argued that the lien
was invalid. We affirmed the general
rules in Eccles and Midvale Home but concluded that the lien claimant could only
aggregate claims if the various lots and
structures described in the lien were owned
by the same person.
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this
case acquired their interests in the property subsequent to the time the mechanic's
lien attached. Unlike the situation in the
Mecham case, Bradshaw was apparently
the only owner of the affected property
when the lien attached, i.e., when construction started. Finally, the Banks do not
argue that the lien misled them as to the
claimed lien, nor have they demonstrated
any prejudice from the aggregation of the
claims in this case. Thus, we hold that the
lien notice was not invalid, at least as
against the Banks, simply because Projects
failed to segregate the contract amounts
attributable to individual condominium
units.
2. Describing More Property Than Was
Subject To Lien
[10,11] The Banks argue that even if
Projects was not required to segregate the
claims attributable to each condominium
unit, the lien was invalid for describing

more property than was properly subject to
the lien. However, the general rule is that
the inclusion of
more land than that to which the lien
may properly attach does not vitiate the
lien upon so much of the land as is encompassed within the description and to
which a lien may properly attach, at least
if the description is not fraudulent or
grossly misleading and innocent third
parties are not affected.
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, claim,
or statement of Mechanic's lien with respect to description or location of real
property, 52 A.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see
also Adams Tree Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 Ariz.App. 214.
511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) (valid portion of
lien can be severed from invalid portion);
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d
109, 112 (Ct.App.1985) ("the land properly
subject to the lien is for the court to determine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock
Silver Mining Co., 86 Utah 145, 103 P. 254,
259 (1909) ("court may limit the amount [of
land] to what may be necessary"); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781
(lien which contained "no adequate description of the property" upheld where no
claim of prejudice or being misled); Engle
v. First Nat'I Bank, 590 P.2d 826, 832
(Wyo.1979) (validating lien which described
entire ranch rather than small parcel upon
Which house was constructed since no
showing of prejudice by bank).
We are persuaded that no purpose of the
mechanic's lien statute would be served by
totally invalidating a lien which overdescribes the property upon which the lien can
properly attach. There is no evidence in
the record to suggest that the description
was fraudulent. Moreover, the Banks do
not argue that they were misled or prejudiced by the description. Therefore, we
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
overly broad description results in the
lien's invalidity as to the Banks.11

11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reiterate that in holding that the description does
not invalidate the lien as to the Banks, we do
not mean to suggest that the result would be the

same for others. The lien, for example, is ineffective as to the phase II property, in which the
Banks claim no interest, and inclusion of that
property in the lien notices would subject
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3. Describing Property Not Initially
Owned By Bradshaw
[12] The Banks argue that the description may have included property not even
owned by Bradshaw at the time the work
was commenced on the project. They argue, citing Mecham, that this fact alone
invalidates the lien. We do not think Mecham stands for this proposition. In Mecham, we invalidated the lien because "the
materials, for which claim was made, were
not furnished upon buildings owned by
the same person or persons." 12 Utah 2d
at 339, 366 P.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
Here, the Banks do not argue that any of
the materials or labor went into the construction of buildings not initially owned by
Bradshaw but simply that some of the land
included in the notice was not owned by
Bradshaw at the outset of construction.
We fail to see much of a distinction for
this case between a lien which includes too
much property owned by the same owner
and too much property part of which is
owned by another person. In either event,
the court can determine what part of the
property is actually subject to the lien.
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho at 498, 700 P.2d
at 112. Whether the other person would
have an action for slander of title is a
separate matter. See supra note 11.
Again, the Banks do not complain that they
were actually misled or prejudiced by the
notice. Thus, under these facts, the overly
expansive property description did not compromise any purpose of the statute and
does not invalidate the lien as to the Banks.
4. Inclusion Of Separate Contracts In
One Lien
The Banks also argue that the lien must
fail because the construction work on the
property was performed under two separate contracts. Although the Banks advance this argument, they fail to cite much
authority to support their position or to
give any policy reasons for adopting such a
r
ule. Utah courts have not addressed this
question before, and there is a split of
Projects to appropriate relief in a slander of title

authority among other jurisdictions which
have considered it.
[13] Some courts have held that when
work is performed under separate contracts, the work may not be aggregated
into a single lien claim. Rather, a separate
notice must be recorded for each contract.
See, e.g., FA. Drew Glass Co. v. Eagle
Mill, 1 Kan.App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390 (1895);
Schively v. Radell, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 76 A.
209, 211 (1910). Other jurisdictions, however, have allowed lien claimants to file a
single notice even though the work was
performed under more than one contract.
See, e.g., Alabama State Fair & Agricultural Ass'n v. Alabama Gas Fixture &
Plumbing Co., 131 Ala. 256, 31 So. 26, 28
(1901); Booth v. Pendola, 88 Cal. 36, 25 P.
1101, 1101 (1891); Parsons v. Keeney, 98
Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923);
Saint Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc.,
158 Ind.App. 272, 302 N.E.2d 865, 874-76
(1973); Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v.
Jenson Elec. Contracting, Inc., 272 Or.
376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975); Fischer v. Meiroff,
192 Wis. 482, 484, 213 N.W. 283, 285 (1927).
After reviewing the various cases, we
find more persuasive the cases which have
allowed the aggregation of claims arising
under more than one contract. In Consolidated Electric, one of the comparatively
more recent cases, the Oregon Supreme
Court allowed a lien claimant to file a single lien notice covering two contracts with
separate owners. Although the court stated that it did not favor the practice, it
noted that each owner was sufficiently notified of the lien against its property and no
"prejudice [had] been suffered by the defendants in any material respect." 272 Or.
at 383, 537 P.2d at 83. The holding of
Consolidated Electric significantly departed from earlier Oregon case law. See, e.g.,
Dimitre Elec. Co. v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151
P.2d 630 (1944). In changing its position,
the Oregon court recognized that "the modern trend [in mechanic's lien law] is to
dispense with arbitrary rules which have
no demonstrable value in a particular fact
situation." Consolidated Elec. Dist., Inc.,
272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82.
action.

See supra note 5.
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[14] The reasoning in Consolidated
Electric makes sense, and we adopt that
position in this case. Again, the Banks do
not argue that the notice failed to adequately notify them of the existence of the
lien or in any way prejudiced them. Thus,
we hold that the inclusion of claims arising
under two separate contracts in a single
lien notice did not invalidate Projects' lien.
5.

Summary

The Banks do not seriously claim that
any of the alleged description failures misled or prejudiced them. The lien notices,
while not a model of clarity and precision,
appear to have adequately accomplished
the purposes of the statute as concerns the
Banks. Thus, we hold that Projects' lien
notice substantially complied with sections
38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of the mechanic's lien
statute. Accordingly, the lien is valid, at
least as between the parties to this appeal.
V. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN
UNDER SECTION 57-8-19
[15] The Banks also argue that the lien
notice was invalid under the Condominium
Ownership Act, which provides in pertinent
part, with our emphasis:
Subsequent to recording the declaration as provided in this act, and while the
property remains subject to this act, no
lien shall thereafter arise or be effective
against the property. During such period liens or encumbrances shall arise or
be created only against each unit .
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953). The
Banks argue that Projects' lien arose and
was effective only after recordation of the
condominium declaration. Thus, they argue, Projects was required to file a notice
of lien for each specific condominium unit.
Utah appellate courts have not had an
opportunity to interpret section 57-8-19 in
this context. However, both the Montana
and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have interpreted statutes nearly identical to Utah's in
contexts similar to this case. See Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167,
561 P.2d 1323 (1977); Stevens Constr.

Corp. v. Draper Hall, Inc., 73 Wis.2d 104,
242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).
The facts in Hostetter, Stevens, and the
instant case are essentially the same. In
each case, the developer contracted for the
construction of condominium units and construction work began. Thereafter, the developers filed condominium declarations.
Some time later, the contractors filed mechanic's liens which described the entire
property on which the condominium complex was constructed and failed to allocate
separate amounts to the different units.
In each case, the defendants argued that a
blanket lien over the entire project was
inappropriate once the condominium declaration had been filed.
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens
held that the blanket lien was sufficient.
Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 173, 561 P.2d at
1326-27; Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898. Both courts noted that the
key factor was the point when the liens
arose and became effective against the
property; both courts held that this occurred at the commencement of construction. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 172-73, 561
P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114,
242 N.W.2d at 898 The filing of the lien
notice merely preserved and perfected the
lien. Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898. The only effect that the
condominium declaration had was to make
the blanket lien proportionately effective
against each unit constructed under the
subject contract along with its corresponding undivided interest in the common area.
Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 174, 561 P.2d at
1327; Stevens, 73 Wis 2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898.
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostetter and Stevens. They note that, unlike
this case, the work in those cases was done
under a single contract. They argue that
this fact alone should produce a different
result, but they do not state the reasons
for their conclusion. We have concluded
that a lien notice may include work performed under separate contracts and fail to
see why the result should be different
when the work is performed on a condo-
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minium project.12
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and
Stevens sound and adopt their rationale.
Section 57-8-19 does not affect the validity
of the lien in this case. The lien arose and
became effective when Projects commenced work on the project. As previously
noted, the lien notice was sufficient to perfect that lien, making the lien valid at least
as to the units properly subject to the lien
and as between the parties to this appeal.
The only effect of section 57-8-19 and the
intermediate filing of the declaration was
to make the lien proportionately effective
against each unit constructed under the
subject contracts and each such unit's corresponding undivided interest in the common area. Having concluded that the lien
notice is not facially invalid as to the
Banks, we turn now to the separate arguments presented by Valley Bank and Cottonwood Thrift.
VI. VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL
The trial court granted summary judgment to Valley Bank on the basis of Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1988). That statute
provides in pertinent part:
Actions to enforce [mechanic's] liens
must be begun within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within
the twelve months herein mentioned the
lien claimant shall file for record with the
county recorder of each county in which
the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provid12. In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically
noted that the blanket lien was effective against
the entire condominium project because "the
work was performed under one contract, and
not a series of separate contracts for each unit."
Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167,
170, 561 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently,
Montana courts have adopted the position that a
single lien may not encompass work performed
under multiple contracts. See Caird Eng'g
Works v. Seven-up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont.
471, 487-89, 111 P.2d 267, 276 (1941). We have
declined to adopt that position and thus disavow
that aspect of the Hostetter decision.
^

Although both parties have characterized section 38-1-11 as a statute of limitation, we do not
view it strictly as such. Rather, it contains one

ed in actions affecting the title or right
to possession of real property, or the lien
shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and
persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action
Id.
[16] Projects commenced this action
and recorded its lis pendens five months
after it ceased construction, well within the
statutory twelve-month period. It did not,
however, add Valley Bank as a defendant
until it filed its amended complaint, nearly
twenty months after construction ceased.
Valley Bank argued, and the trial court
agreed, that section 38-1-11 is a statute of
limitation13 which required Projects to
name Valley Bank as a defendant within
the twelve-month period, on pain of its action against Valley Bank being forever
barred. We read section 38-1-11 differently.
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements
which serve two different purposes. First,
the statute requires the lien claimant to
commence his action within twelve months
of the completion of the project or suspension of work. See supra note 13. Valley
Bank argues that the lien claimant is also
required by this provision to join all persons having an interest in the property
within the twelve-month period. However,
the statute does not expressly require the
lien claimant to do so and, on the contrary
as hereafter explained, obviously contemplates the joinder of defendants not initially
of the requirements with which the claimant
must comply "before [that] party is entitled to
the benefits created by the [mechanic's lien]
statute." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. &
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). The
penalty for not commencing an action to enforce a mechanic's lien within the twelve-month
period provided in section 38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien rather than preclusion of the
claim as with a traditional statute of limitation.
See, e.g, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (Supp.
1986). The commencement requirement of section 38-1-11 serves as a substantive restriction
on the lien action and, unlike a true statute of
limitation, is not waived if not pleaded. AAA,
714 P.2d at 291.
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named after the expiration of the twelve-'.month period.
[17] The second ''requirement'* of sec-,.
tion 38-1-11 is that the hen claimant file 32
lis pendens within the twelve-month period.
However, the limited effect of a failure to}
comply with this requirement is expresslyT
set forth in the statute. When a claimantj.
fails to file the lis pendens within the
twelve-month period, the lien itself is not•:
invalidated, but rather it is rendered voidI
as to everyone except those named in the5
action and those with actual knowledge off
the action. By contrast, it follows logically, timely recordation of the lis pendens\
imparts constructive notice to all persons>
concerned with the property of the action1
to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-40-2 (1989), regardless of whether
they were named as parties or had actual[
knowledge of the action.
Valley Bank's contrary interpretationL
would render portions of the statute meaningless or nonsensical. See Millett v,
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936
(Utah 1980) ("[Statutory enactments are to
be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which render
some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd."). For one thing, it would be
pointless to provide that a lien would be
valid as against persons with actual knowledge of the action to enforce the lien who
had not been named as parties in the action
as filed within the twelve-month period unless it were fully anticipated that such parties could be brought into the action, by
amendment, beyond the twelve-month period. It would make no sense to consider the
lien to be valid as against such persons
unless it could be enforced against them by
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had
not recorded its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank
would still be subject to the lien because it had
actual knowledge of Projects' action by no later
than August 1984, when it reviewed a title report disclosing the action and commenced a
dialogue with Projects concerning the matter.
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to
California and Illinois decisions holding that a
lien claimant may in no event add defendants
after expiration of the dealine for filing a mechanic's lien action, we are not persuaded by

joining them in the action as previously
commenced. Moreover, failure to join a
defendant in the complaint as filed within
the twelve-month period cannot be conclusively fatal to the claimant's ability to enforce the lien as against the defendant or it
would be meaningless for the statute to
refer to the continued effectiveness of the
lien, even absent timely recordation of a lis
pendens, as against non-parties, like Valley
Bank in this case, who have actual knowledge of the action.
[18,19] We conclude that section 38-111 should be read as a whole to require a
lien claimant to commence a mechanic's
lien action and record a corresponding lis
pendens within the twelve-month period.
Commencing the action preserves the lien.
Recording the lis pendens imparts constructive notice of the lien enforcement action to everyone interested in the liened
property. Only when the claimant fails to
timely record the lis pendens can an interested person argue that it is not subject to
the lien, and then only if such person was
not named as a party and did not have
actual knowledge of the action.
[20] In this case, Projects commenced
the action and filed the lis pendens within
the required twelve-month period. Valley
Bank was therefore subject to the lien14
and could properly be joined by an appropriate amendment to the complaint as was
done in this case. The trial court accordingly erred when it dismissed Valley Bank
from the action.15
VII. AMBIGUITY OF "PARTIAL"
LIEN RELEASE
The trial court granted Cottonwood
Thrift & Loan Company's summary judgment motion on two grounds: First, the
those decisions. As previously noted, unlike
California and Illinois statutes, section 38-1-11
is not a true statute of limitation. See supra
note 13. Moreover, our statute is significantly
different from the statutes in California and
Illinois because it does not merely impose a
deadline for commencement of the action, but
goes on to delineate persons who will be subject
to the lien even though not joined in the action
within the twelve-month period. Our attention
is drawn to no decision construing similar language in any other mechanic's lien statute.
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court concluded that, "based on undisputed
facts," Cottonwood Thrift had reasonably
relied upon the recorded lien release. Second, the court concluded that the effect of
the release was clear on its face. Projects
argues on appeal that the release was ambiguous. It also argues that reasonable
reliance is a concept necessarily too factsensitive for disposition by summary judgment.
[21] Whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law. E.g., Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199,
1200 (Utah 1983). Moreover, the trial court
must determine "whether a contract is ambiguous . . . before it takes any evidence in
clarification." Id. It follows, therefore,
that if the contract is clear on its face, the
trial court need not—and in fact should
not—consider evidence of a contrary meaning.
[22-24] The release in this case stated
in pertinent part that Projects "in consideration of [$90,000] . . . does hereby release,
satisfy and discharge that certain claim of
lien . . . against the following described
real property." The release then described
units 4 and 5. This language is susceptible
of no other interpretation but that the two
units were completely released from the
scope of the lien.16 The trial court properly
construed the release as a matter of law
and properly declined to consider evidence
of another intent. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss
Cottonwood Thrift from the action.17
16. Projects argues that the release was ambiguous because the word "Partial" was added to the
"Release of Lien" heading. However, in the
context of this case, the release clearly was
"partial" because it only released two of the
eight units otherwise covered by the lien notice.
We do not believe that the addition created any
ambiguity in the instrument.
In the determination of the real character of a
contract, courts will always look to its purpose rather than to the name given it by the
parties, and where a conflict exists between a
name attempted to be applied to a particular
contract and the language of the contract itself, the name will be rejected as inapplicable.
17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 269 (1964) (footnote
omitted).
17. Because we agree that the release was clear
and was not ambiguous, we need not address
Projects' reasonable reliance arguments.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The trial court's order and judgment of
dismissal are affirmed only as they relate
to Cottonwood Thrift.18 As to Copper
State and Valley Bank, we reverse and
remand for trial or other appropriate proceedings consistent with this decision.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified
herself, does not participate herein;
GREGORY K. ORME, Court of Appeals
Judge, sat.

CORNISH TOWN, a municipal
corporation, Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v.
Evan O. ROLLER and Marlene B. Roller, husband and wife, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890020.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 19, 1990.
Town brought action against homeowners to determine certain water rights,
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award
attorney fees based upon Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-18 (1988), which provides: "In any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed
by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action." In view of our holding, except as concerns Cottonwood Thrift, determination of any
party's "success" is clearly premature. In the
case of Cottonwood Thrift, we note that it, along
with the other banks, did not request attorney
fees as part of its motion for summary judgment. We will not entertain issues raised for
the first time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l Bank
v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657
(Utah 1988). Therefore, we decline to consider
Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even
though it has successfully defeated Projects'
claims against it.

